---
title: "Secure Caracal"
url: "https://docs.caracal.run/v1.0/security/"
markdown_url: "https://docs.caracal.run/markdown/v1.0/security.md"
description: "Review, verify, harden, and respond to security risks in the open-source runtime."
page_type: "landing"
concepts: []
requires: []
---

# Secure Caracal

Canonical URL: https://docs.caracal.run/v1.0/security/
Markdown URL: https://docs.caracal.run/markdown/v1.0/security.md
Description: Review, verify, harden, and respond to security risks in the open-source runtime.
Page type: landing
Concepts: none
Requires: none

---

This section covers OSS code and assets in this repository, not enterprise code, customer infrastructure, external identity providers/upstreams, or model behavior.

## The Security Model in Brief

Caracal's core security idea is that programs hold **authority, not credentials**: instead of standing API keys, a program receives a short-lived signed pass for exactly one approved action, and every link in that chain fails closed. Four properties carry the model:

| Property | What it means | Mechanics |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Deny by default | Nothing is callable until a resource is registered, a grant path exists, and the active policy allows the request. | [Authority and Enforcement](/v1.0/concepts/authority-model/) |
| Fail closed | A policy, key, replay, revocation, Session, or Approval failure stops issuance; a verification failure stops the request before the upstream. | [Mandates](/v1.0/concepts/mandate/) |
| Central revocation | Ending a Session, Delegation, or Authority record invalidates dependent authority without key rotation or redeploys. | [Sessions and Revocation](/v1.0/concepts/sessions-revocation/) |
| Tamper-evident evidence | Decisions and results are recorded append-only with integrity checks, replay, and dead-letter paths. | [Audit and Request Traces](/v1.0/concepts/audit-ledger/) |

## What Is Enforced, Recommended, and Yours

An honest evaluation separates three categories. Repository code enforces the first; documentation recommends the second; only you can provide the third.

**Enforced by the code** (verifiable in source and tests):

* STS fails closed on Policy, key, replay, revocation, Session, Approval, and signing failures.
* Gateway authorizes before dispatch and applies binding, egress, redirect, replay, and revocation controls.
* Published modes require integrity keys and authenticated metrics.
* Audit is append-only/tamper-evident with replay and DLQ paths.
* Runtime secrets remain outside untrusted application/agent workspaces.
* OSS behavior does not depend on enterprise code.

**Recommended practices** (documented, not forced): pin and [verify releases](/v1.0/security/verify-releases/), keep mandate TTLs short, use shared revocation stores in production, route provider credentials through Gateway brokering, and walk the [hardening checklist](/v1.0/security/hardening/) before real traffic.

**Your responsibilities** (outside the repository's reach): host and network isolation, TLS termination, identity-provider governance, key custody and rotation cadence, backup and restore testing, monitoring ownership, and any compliance program. Repository controls contribute evidence to those programs; they never satisfy them alone.

## Choose a Review

| Goal | Page |
| --- | --- |
| Assets, boundaries, threats, residual risk | [Review the Threat Model](/v1.0/security/threat-model/) |
| Deployed environment review | [Harden Security Posture](/v1.0/security/hardening/) |
| Artifact verification | [Verify a Release](/v1.0/security/verify-releases/) |
| Repository evidence | [Generate an Evidence Pack](/v1.0/security/evidence-pack/) |
| Private reporting | [Report a Vulnerability](/v1.0/security/disclosure/) |
| Adoption controls and non-claims | [Review OSS Adoption Readiness](/v1.0/security/adoption-review/) |

## Review Completion

Tie every claim to version, config, source/test evidence, and observed result. Repository controls do not replace host hardening, identity governance, recovery testing, or compliance programs.

## Next Step

Start with [Review the Threat Model](/v1.0/security/threat-model/).